
The government’s fiscal and monetary policies have recently been made public through the budget speech and Nepal Rastra Bank’s (NRB) policy announcement. Needless to emphasise, there should be close coordination between the two to achieve the overall objectives. The regional distribution of financial services has no real rural distributional decomposition and shows a skewed distributional pattern thus: eastern region 18.4 percent, central region 49.5 percent, western region 19.8, mid-western region 7.5 and far western region 4.6 percent. Moreover, the monetary policy has ignored the coming financial federalism and inclusive financial services with a rural vision with the exception of ritual recitation of microfinance, which will essentially be an important part of the emerging fiscal federalism within the framework of federal states.
The objectives of the monetary policy as specified in the NRB Act, 2002 remain as the bottom line to (i) Contain stability in domestic prices and balance of payments (ii) Secure financial stability and (iii) Support economic growth.
To achieve these objectives, NRB on the basis of relative controllability and predictability has opted for narrow money (M1) and broad money (M2) as the intermediate targets. In other words, the pass through effect of the monetary policy on the final objectives is transmitted through the intermediate targets.
The monetary policy document basically includes major policy stance, management of foreign exchange, external sector reform, financial sector regulation and supervision and the status of implementation of the previous year’s policy, among others. With minor exceptions a few times, major objectives like the growth rate and inflation are exactly the same in the fiscal and monetary policies and the monetary aggregates are estimated arithmetically to support the growth rate and inflation giving due computational role to income velocity.
Obviously, stability in inflation is difficult to attain through monetary policy alone since prices in Nepal closely move in line with Indian prices due to an open border, fixed exchange rate and India being a major trade partner as well as the various non-monetary phenomena related domestic prices and supply constraints. One can easily argue that Nepal would have to face a much higher double digit price rise had Indian prices not declined so sharply in recent months. It is equally important in the case of stability in the balance of payments for which the fiscal policy should strongly support through reasonable fiscal deficit, particularly government domestic borrowing. Similarly, the monetary policy can support the fiscal policy through financial services for economic growth where key factors like infrastructure and private sector-led growth are not sufficiently developed.
The trade-off between flexible and tight monetary policy stance in order to support the slow economic activity, impulsive financial stability, unstable price movements and risky enough external sector stability makes it difficult to achieve the multiple objectives resulting in a secure cushion concept of a cautious policy stance. However, there is no practice of making accountable on the basis of target/policy performance which would have commonly been taken as an acid test of the policy makers for the successful trading off among various objectives..
Obviously, there are some noticeable targeted policy plans in the current year’s monetary policy that include (i) Export import price indices (XMIP) to measure trade competitiveness (ii) Study of Nepal’s macroeconomic modelling under the TA of the Asian Development Bank (iii) Study of the identification of Indian currency in circulation in Nepal and (iv) Compilation of broad monetary surveys including development banks and finance companies. However, there are some structural and policy weaknesses in trading off and guiding the future direction in the monetary policy.
Nevertheless, a cautious tight monetary policy has been followed from last year. Moreover, it has been further tightened this year by reintroducing the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) of 8 percent, 3 percent and 2 percent of the total domestic currency deposit for A, B and C category banks/institutions including the directed deprived sector credit programme of 3 percent, 2 percent and 1.5 percent of the total loans respectively. As such, the SLR itself, which is to be compulsorily invested in government securities, will block more than Rs. 40 billion of banks and finance companies at a relatively lower return by the end of the year unless there is a compensatory special SLR bond with a higher coupon rate.
In other words, such directed liquidity ratio and credit programme will help to reciprocate more than an equal impact on the increase in financial intermediation costs of banks and financial institutions leading to further concentration of credit in highly lucrative sectors and also a psychic discouraging impact on small depositors in particular and selective preference to big depositors in general. As a result, the spread rate, which is known as financial intermediation cost, could be unexpectedly larger since banks/institutions are free to maintain it.
The refinance/bank rate facility, which has remained an effective instrument in most of similarly placed economies, has virtually remained ineffective, though officially termed as an indicator of policy stance for the last many years in Nepal.
It is an open secret that illegal circulation of Indian currency within Nepal is a sensitive currency sovereignty issue. In the absence of a broad based empirically validated survey regarding the magnitude of the circulation of Indian currency in Nepal, it is obvious that the demand for Nepalese currency/money is overtly underestimated. As such, the money supply based on the demand for money neither reflects an accurate picture nor a sound base for the estimation of the impact on inflation and economic growth. One can hope that the proposed study will identify the size of the Indian currency in circulation and make use as a proxy for the estimation of monetary aggregates, where the monetary policy alone could not tap the Indian currency to banking channel. Presently, the estimation of monetary aggregates is underestimated, that is why it cannot accurately help to stabilize the price level.
Due to economic efficiency India could bear a higher interest rate which is difficult for Nepal to maintain. It is a very critical issue, though untouched in the policy papers, that until and unless economic activities can be retained and sustained, a higher interest rate will not be feasible in Nepal leaving more than enough room for capital flight to India due mainly to the interest rate differential.
Looking at the increasing size of both the number of financial institutions and their volume of transactions of many types of deposit money, the time is overdue to incorporate them in the monetary aggregates. Similarly, looking at the stronger relationship of monetary aggregates with income and prices, the savings deposit based on its withdrawal limit has to be segregated both in the narrow and broad money for ensuring their accuracy. Savings deposit based on its withdrawal limit is just like a semi-demand deposit which needs to be split into both narrow and broad money to ensure the accuracy of the measurement of narrow money.
In an inflation targeting country, the central bankers are known as price controllers. As such, to be on safe side and build up greater confidence, NRB has to be more transparent in expressing the limited impact of the money supply on the price level. For this, the core inflation, basically known as monetary phenomenon related prices, out of the overhead inflation should be identified so that the price stability target can be met more accurately. Similarly, NRB should convince the concerned authorities and hand over the job of collecting and processing the price data to uphold the theoretical ethic from the probability of manipulation for the sake of justifying targeted objective.
The mandatory book write-off policy for defaulted loans of banks and financial institutions should be followed by some mechanism like the establishment of Asset Management Company to ensure the recovery of defaulted loans as per international practice. However, in Nepal, the problem banks mainly Rastriya Banijya Bank and Nepal Bank Ltd. have gained the opportunity to transfer more than Rs. 27 billion to the write-off account as a sleepy gain of recuperation on the level of non-performing assets (NPA) without the support of a backup mechanism for recovery efforts.



